Architecture for Mobile Data Offload over Wi-Fi Access Networks

Introduction

Mobile network traffic is growing exponentially, and service providers must manage their networks efficiently to meet consumer demand. The technology evolution of radio access networks is limited by the laws of physics, and significant growth in radio frequency (RF) efficiency can no longer be expected. Long-Term Evolution (LTE) radio access is reaching the limits of Shannon’s law, the spectrum available for mobile data applications is limited, and the only solution for increasing overall mobile network capacity is to increase the carrier-to-interference ratio while decreasing cell size and deploying small cell technologies.

The most efficient way to use small cells is to position them in locations where significant amounts of data are generated (shopping malls, stadiums, university campuses, public transportation hubs, etc.) and where subscribers spend most of their time and therefore consume significant amounts of data (homes, offices, etc.).

Wi-Fi, one of the small cell technologies, appeals to many operators as a cost-effective mean of offloading large amounts of mobile data traffic while delivering a variety of new services. It offers these features:

- Widespread existing deployments
- Availability of user devices that support the technology
- Cost efficiency
- Capability to address new users and devices without mobile subscription (without a subscriber identity module [SIM])
- Globally available spectrum capacity
- Standards availability for integration into mobile core networks

This document explores technical aspects of Wi-Fi offload architecture and its capabilities and integration into existing mobile networks to provide a viable and efficient way to offload subscriber traffic.

Overview of Wi-Fi Offload Architecture

The Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard differentiates two types of Wi-Fi access (also referred to as non-3GPP IP access):

- Untrusted: Introduced in the early stages of the Wi-Fi specification in 3GPP Release 6 (2005), untrusted access includes any type of Wi-Fi access that either is not under control of the operator (public open hotspot, subscriber’s home WLAN, etc.) or that does not provide sufficient security (authentication, encryption, etc.).
- Trusted: Trusted access generally refers to operator-built Wi-Fi access with over-the-air encryption and a secure authentication method. Trusted non-3GPP IP access was introduced only with the LTE standard in 3GPP Release 8 (2008). Although most of today’s offload designs are build on the trusted model, 3GPP does not currently offer guidance for integration with the 3G or 2G packet core. However, as discussed in this document, this type of access is natively integrated into LTE’s evolved packet core (EPC).
Because most of today’s mobile networks are 3G based, a significant part of this document describes the possible methods of integrated trusted non-3GPP IP access into the 3G mobile packet core (MPC) together with its associated policy and charging control (PCC) architecture. Although the term “trusted non-3GPP IP access” is defined for EPC only, this document extends its definition in 3G contexts to describe Wi-Fi networks controlled by mobile operators.

3GPP 24.302 has the following definition: “For a trusted non-3GPP IP access network, the communication between the user equipment and the EPC is secure.” Thus, with the latest service provider Wi-Fi architectures encompassing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and IEEE 802.1X-based authentication, and with IEEE 802.11i-based RF encryption and optional use of control and provisioning of wireless access points and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for secured user and control planes, all the elements exist for service provider Wi-Fi to be considered as trusted non-3GPP.

After the 3G designs, this document describes the evolution of the architectures toward EPC integration as specified in 3GPP standards. Session mobility and, more generally, IP address persistence when moving between 3G, LTE, and Wi-Fi are also covered. The document also discusses the integration models for untrusted networks, although these are less commonly deployed in mobile networks.

In the 3GPP specification, the Wi-Fi network is referred to as the Wi-Fi access network only. No details about the Wi-Fi network structure are specified. This document, however, separates the network into the access and gateway components. The Wi-Fi network infrastructure for mobile data offload consists of three parts:

- Wi-Fi radio access network (Wi-Fi RAN)
- Wi-Fi access gateway (WAG) and Wi-Fi back-end systems (this document expands the definition from 3GPP TS 23.234 to refer also to non-3GPP WAG)
- Packet core integration elements (multiple options)
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture. It includes integration elements for 3G as well as LTE to show a summary of all designs built throughout this document.

**Figure 1.** Wi-Fi Network Architecture

If the Wi-Fi network is used for mobile data offload, which is the topic of this document, it needs to take care of these tasks:

- **Authentication**: To help ensure that only authorized subscribers can access the network
- **PCC**: For proper billing, quality of service (QoS), and policy enforcement for the traffic generated through Wi-Fi access, ideally compliant with 3GPP PCC
- **IP persistence**: For service mobility between different access networks (3G to Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi to 3G, or across the Wi-Fi network)

The following sections examine the details of each of these functions.

**Authentication**

To control subscriber access to Wi-Fi networks, multiple authentication methods can be used. The choice of method is crucial to the usability of the network. The more transparent the authentication method is for the subscriber, the greater the likelihood that the subscriber will connect to the network.

The authentication method also determines the subscriber and device types that can be addressed in a particular network (subscribers with or without SIM cards, the operator’s subscribers, visiting subscribers, etc.).

In a typical modern Wi-Fi network, two types of authentication are available to address all possible subscribers and at the same time provide convenient access to the network for frequent Wi-Fi users. The first method, portal-based authentication, targets customers without a permanent contract with the operator (vouchers, time-limited
access, SMS payments, etc.). Alternatively, EAP authentication provides transparent and easy access for the operator’s own subscribers with SIM cards or certificates.

**Portal-Based Authentication**

Portal-based authentication depends on Layer 3 connectivity to the network and HTTP communication before granting access to the subscriber. The Wireless Internet Service Provider Roaming (WISPr) standard also uses HTTP communication with the portal for automatic authentication, with the user device launching HTTP communication in the background without user intervention (Figure 2).

*Figure 2.* Portal-Based Authentication Architecture

This method relies on the WAG in the Wi-Fi network, which blocks all IP communication for unknown (new) subscribers and redirects HTTP connections to a captive portal. The captive portal is responsible for requesting user credentials from the subscriber and triggering authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) to authenticate the subscriber. After successful login, the WAG will typically be signaled by the AAA server. From this moment, the subscriber is known in the AAA cache, and WAG allows the subscriber to send and receive data. Usually, the user’s IEEE 802.11 MAC address is also cached in the AAA server, together with the user data and granted service. If the subscriber leaves the Wi-Fi coverage area and then returns, the subscriber’s device will be recognized by the WAG based on the MAC address and automatically authenticated against the cached AAA record, so the subscriber is not repeatedly redirected to the portal after losing Wi-Fi coverage. This method of MAC address caching is also referred to as transparent automatic logon (TAL).
A typical TAL attachment call flow is shown in Figure 3 for the case of a Layer 2 attached WAG.

**Figure 3.** Typical Transparent Automatic Logon Call Flow

**EAP-Based Authentication**

EAP-based authentication uses EAP and IEEE 802.1x to provide Layer 2 authentication for subscribers accessing the network with EAP-capable devices. For actual authentication, multiple credentials can be used, depending on the capability of the device.

Devices with SIM cards encapsulate the SIM application information exchange into the EAP message, and these are proxied by the AAA server to the home-location register (HLR) for authentication. EAP-SIM (RFC 4186) or EAP-Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA; RFC 4187) standards are used for the encapsulation, depending on the type of SIM card used and the HLR capabilities. Obviously, this method requires interconnection between the AAA server and the HLR or home-subscriber server (HSS). The architecture is shown in Figure 4.
For subscribers with non-SIM devices, the operator can distribute certificates for EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) or similar versions of EAP authentication.

The typical call flow of EAP authentication (with HLR integration) is shown in Figure 5.
Note that EAP-based authentication offers a radio security advantage. Because the authentication is handled at Layer 2, EAP messages can be used to negotiate encryption keys for the IEEE 802.11i-based encryption of the radio interface. This approach provides much stronger security for radio communication compared to the unencrypted radio interface of portal-based authentication and is uniquely able to prevent simple MAC address spoofing attacks.

Next Generation Hotspot

In 2010, Cisco and industry leaders formed the Next Generation Hotspot Task Group in the Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA). The goal was to rally the industry around a common set of Wi-Fi Alliance (WFA) standards called Hotspot 2.0 that would bring a 3G-like end-user experience to Wi-Fi authentication and roaming. The outcome of the Next Generation Hotspot Task Group is a set of operator guidelines and the Wi-Fi Certified Passpoint™ program expected in 2012 from the Wi-Fi Alliance. The certification will help ensure authentication and roaming interoperability for operators and equipment vendors.

The Cisco® SP Wi-Fi solution features Next Generation Hotspot, enabling service providers to better manage and monetize their carrier-grade Wi-Fi networks.

There are three main building blocks of the next-generation hotspot: IEEE 802.11u, Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA 2) Enterprise, and EAP-based authentication.

For a detailed description of the initiative, see The Future of Hotspots: Making Wi-Fi as Secure and Easy to Use as Cellular.

Authentication Summary

Because of the complementary functions of both authentication methods, mobile operators deploying Wi-Fi access networks usually implement both EAP and IEEE 802.1X authentication and portal-based authentication in their networks.

Portal-based authentication is used to attract subscribers visiting the network who don’t yet have a relation to the operator. It allows typical public Wi-Fi use cases such as credit card payments, vouchers, and SMS passwords. In general, it enables generation of new revenue from Wi-Fi networks.

EAP-based authentication targets primarily devices with the operator’s SIM card. It allows transparent authentication and secure communication without much interaction from the subscriber (only initial configuration of the service set ID (SSID) is needed when a device detects the Wi-Fi network for the first time). In real-life deployments, the introduction of EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA authentication leads to significantly better utilization of the network by subscribers and therefore enables much greater savings from offloading.

With the introduction of Wi-Fi Certified Passpoint devices, operators will be able to simplify Wi-Fi network access even more. IEEE 802.11u devices do not need any intervention from the subscriber to connect to the Wi-Fi network (unlike traditional devices, which require SSID selection). Roaming agreements based on the Next Generation Hotspot recommendation (WLAN Roaming Inter-Exchange [WRIX]) enable user equipment with IEEE 802.11u support to choose the right SSID automatically, even in visited networks.

Policy and Charging Control

An important concern of mobile operators is the availability of similar or identical policy enforcement and charging rules for the subscriber, regardless of the RAN being used. Therefore, the design of PCC integration is a crucial part of Wi-Fi offload.
Experience from live deployments shows that the most efficient approach to PCC integration is the reuse of the elements deployed for the 3GPP services. The actual integration option will depend on the PCC infrastructure implemented in the particular mobile operator network. If the operator uses a device with the standalone policy and charging enforcement function (PCEF), the WAG will be integrated as an additional gateway served by the PCEF. If the PCEF is integrated into the gateway General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) support node (GGSN), the WAG may emulate a serving GPRS support node (SGSN) and switch the Wi-Fi sessions to a GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP) tunnel to the traditional GGSN. The following sections discuss the details of these two options.

Note that this document describes trusted non-3GPP access integration into 2G and 3G PCC. The 3GPP standard offers no guidance for this integration. Later this document explores standardized architecture for LTE integration and untrusted non-3GPP IP access integration.

**Standalone PCEF**

In the standalone PCEF scenario, the WAG is set up to send user data traffic to the PCEF for PCC integration. At the same time, traffic that does not need policy control (traffic from visiting customers, wholesale traffic, one-time voucher users, etc.) is allowed to go directly to the Internet (Figure 6).

**Figure 6.  Standalone PCEF Architecture**

Because the PCEF needs to be able to correlate the user identity with the data flows passing the PCEF, a mechanism is needed that can synchronize the user identity with the IP address of the subscriber (so that individual data packets can be associated with the user data plan and processed accordingly). Commonly, the RADIUS proxy function on the PCEF is used to create user session information based on the attributes included in the accounting messages coming from the access gateway for a particular user. Figure 7 shows the typical call flow.
If this model is deployed, the operator needs to help ensure that all mandatory information needed by the PCEF is included in the RADIUS messages from the access gateway or proxied through AAA, where the necessary attributes are added to the message. In addition to the IP address of the subscriber session, information about the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), the mobile station international subscriber directory number (MSISDN), and the associated access point name (APN) is usually required.

**GTP to Traditional GGSN**

If the PCEF is an integral part of the GGSN, the option of forcing Wi-Fi sessions into a GTP tunnel (packet data protocol [PDP] context) may provide the best solution for PCC integration. The traffic that does not belong to the mobile subscribers of the operator, and which therefore cannot be processed on the GGSN, is forwarded directly to the Internet (Figure 8).
Clearly, GTP support is required on the WAG for this deployment model. Also important to consider is the availability of the required attributes in the PDP context request, which are mandatory in the operator’s PCC system. Again, these attributes commonly include the IMSI, MSISDN, QoS profile, and APN.

The call flow for this deployment model is shown in Figure 9.
Note that even though all sessions (3G and Wi-Fi) are anchored on the GGSN, this solution does not provide transparent handover of the IP sessions between the Wi-Fi and 3G radio networks. This limitation exists because the Wi-Fi and 3G PDP contexts are individual sessions, and the user device can open them simultaneously. Unfortunately, the 3GPP standard does not provide a mechanism to help ensure that the same GGSN is chosen for both of these PDP contexts, and therefore anchoring of the sessions on the same device cannot be achieved.

**PCC Integration Considerations**

When performing PCC integration, note the following:

- The options listed are valid and needed for 3G. As discussed later, LTE provides native integration into the EPC and therefore into the PCC.
- The critical element is the capability of the WAG to provide all necessary information for charging (specifically, some of these attributes are not part of EAP authentication and need to be retrieved separately, if needed: for example, the MSISDN, the QoS profile, and optionally, the 3GPP charging characteristics).
- Usually, the PCEF does not handle traffic from users who are not mobile customers of the operator (non-SIM subscribers). This traffic is sent directly to the Internet. If these particular sessions need policy or charging functions, these are usually handled by the WAG and Wi-Fi back-end systems directly.

**LTE**

Before describing the third function of the Wi-Fi offload architecture, session handover, this document examines the integration of PCC in an LTE scenario. This examination will help you later understand user session mobility and anchoring.

3GPP TS 23.402 describes native integration of trusted and untrusted non-3GPP IP access networks into the EPC. The standard accepts that the Wi-Fi network is as valid an access network as any other 3GPP radio access network. This acceptance enables operators to use the standards-based EPC components for integration and therefore helps ensure a good level of interoperability between different access types.

As mentioned earlier, this document concentrates first on the trusted part of the architecture. To force the Wi-Fi traffic to the EPC, two interfaces are defined, both of them terminating Wi-Fi sessions on the packet data network gateway (P-GW) as shown in Figure 10.
The S2c interface is based on the Dual-Stack Mobile IP Version 6 (DSMIPv6) protocol and requires user equipment to support it. DSMIPv6 creates a tunneled connection between the user equipment and the P-GW, which is used to forward all traffic to and from the user equipment. The P-GW is responsible for assigning a virtual IP address to the tunnel during the setup process. This IP address is from the same IP pool that is used for LTE sessions. Because all traffic to and from the user equipment is sent through the tunnel, the P-GW has complete visibility of the user traffic and can apply PCC and other necessary functions to the traffic in the same manner as it does to the LTE sessions (Figure 11).
Another option shown in Figure 11 is to choose the S2a interface for forwarding traffic from the Wi-Fi network to the EPC. This interface is based on the Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) protocol. As with S2c, the interface terminates on the P-GW and enables visibility into the user traffic. The difference is that the PMIPv6 protocol does not require any changes on the user equipment. The wireless access gateway (WAG) in the trusted non-3GPP IP access network provides the mobile IP functions transparently for the client. It creates the tunnel, requests the IP address from the P-GW, and then assigns this address to the Wi-Fi connection. In this way, the user equipment is assigned an IP address that is part of the P-GW pool, but it does not see the address as virtual but as a physical address directly on the Wi-Fi interface.

Figure 12 shows an overview of LTE architecture. Again, in addition to tunneled traffic to the EPC, direct connection from the WAG to the Internet is enabled for users who are not mobile subscribers of the operator.
Two methods of integration (S2a and S2c) have been used here, and each has different implications for the deployment. The S2c approach requires changes on the user equipment; therefore, it is considered client-based. This feature may not be trivial in a mobile network because of the need for client software for functions. The mobile operator must help ensure that large numbers of different handsets and operating systems can be addressed by the software, must keep the user equipment updated with new versions of software, and must motivate subscribers to use the client software. Figure 13 illustrates the attachment as defined by 3GPP. Phase A represents attachment to the Wi-Fi network. In phase B, the DSMIPv6 tunnel is opened to the P-GW; and in phase C, the session is signaled as the active one. Also illustrated is the establishment of policies for the session using the PCRF.
The S2a approach eliminates the problem of the client software. The trade-off here is that the operator loses control of Wi-Fi activation and session handover on the user equipment. This loss of control may result in unexpected behavior of the user equipment during switchover from 3GPP access to Wi-Fi and back. Figure 14 shows the attachment as defined by 3GPP. The trusted non-3GPP IP access network represents the Wi-Fi network, with the WAG as part of this network. For a detailed description of the call flow, please refer to 3GPP TS 23.402.
Before analyzing different methods of handover, it is important to understand the terms often used in this context. Specifically, you need to understand what session handover is and the types of handover that can be implemented depending on the requirements of the mobile operator.

In mobile data networks, one of the most important procedures is handover - when a subscriber moves from one radio station to another. The handover procedure describes the behavior of the network when the subscriber switches from one radio type to another (for example, from 3G to Wi-Fi).

Today, few handover types can be used. The one required in the operator’s network needs to balance the expectations of subscribers and the complexity of the architecture.
● Handover without IP address persistency (connectivity handover): When a subscriber connects to the Wi-Fi access network, the subscriber is authenticated transparently and is assigned a new IP address by the Wi-Fi network. All new communications can use the new IP address as the source. All established TCP and UDP connections can, however, still continue over the 3G network. If the user equipment logic disables the 3G interface, then these established sockets will need to be (automatically) reestablished over Wi-Fi, using the new IP address.

● Handover with IP persistency (IP handover): When a subscriber connects to the Wi-Fi network, the subscriber will be assigned the same IP address as he used on the 3G or LTE network. If the established TCP and UDP connections are bound to a physical interface (because of the TCP/IP stack implementation of the UE), they will need to be (automatically) reestablished using the new Wi-Fi interface, even though they will use the same IP address.

● Session handover (transparent handover): This type of handover is similar to IP handover, but the handover must occur in a time range that allows real-time media applications (voice over IP, streaming video, etc.) - for example, using established UDP sockets for media and TCP sockets for the control-plane protocol - to continue without interruption or user-experience degradation as the device switches between Wi-Fi and 3G cellular connectivity.

Note that seamless handover can be achieved only with user equipment cooperation, which means that software updating (for client software) is needed on terminals. At minimum, this software needs to provide a virtual interface adapter, to mask the physical interface structure for TCP and UDP sockets. The challenges of client software have already been discussed above.

3GPP defines handover mechanisms for trusted Wi-Fi only as part of the LTE architecture. For untrusted Wi-Fi, proposals exist for 3G and LTE. This document starts with a look at trusted non-3GPP IP access networks in LTE.

S2a-Based Handover (Clientless)

The advantage of PMIPv6 as protocol for the S2a interface is that the protocol is built for network-based IP mobility. Therefore, it can provide, without client involvement, handover of the IP address between different access types. In this design, the P-GW is responsible for anchoring the session, assigning the IP addresses, and switching the PMIPv6 or GTP tunnels between different access gateways in the event of handover. The access gateways must support the mobile access gateway (MAG) function to fulfill all mobile IP-related mobile-node functions.

Figure 15 illustrates the handover call flow as defined in 3GPP TS 23.402. The trusted non-3GPP IP access element is equivalent to a WAG.
Although S2a-based handover is clientless, recall that the problems with Wi-Fi-to-3GPP handover are the existence of two radio interfaces on the user equipment and the role of the user equipment as the handover decision point. Because of these two factors, the network can never ensure that the user equipment is using the proper interface.
**Note:** The definition of what constitutes a proper interface can change on an operator-by-operator basis.

Also, at the user equipment, the TCP/IP stack needs to be able to cope with two physical interfaces that may eventually have identical IP addresses. Additionally, in some TCP/IP stack implementations, application sockets may be bound to a physical interface. Therefore, when the user equipment or application switches between interfaces, the application connections must be dropped and may need to be reestablished from the new interface.

Given all of these dependencies, the PMIPv6-based architecture cannot (without user equipment support) guarantee operation of a transparent handover function on all user equipment types. This situation can be improved if a properly designed connection manager (with virtual adapters) is installed on all user equipment.

Cisco is actively working with chipset and handset vendors to support standardization and development of user equipment that meets the requirements for smooth clientless handover.

**S2c-Based Handover (Client-based)**

For the S2c interface, 3GPP reuses the IETF-defined DSMIPv6 protocol between the user equipment and the P-GW as the anchor point. When on the non-3GPP network, the user equipment builds the DSMIPv6 to the appropriate P-GW and is assigned a virtual IP address, which is then used for application communication. The same IP address will be assigned to the user equipment over a 3GPP access network in the event of handover. The 3GPP network is treated as the home network, and therefore the user equipment does not need to set up a DSMIPv6 tunnel on the 3GPP access network.

Figure 16, from 3GPP TS 23.402, summarizes the call flow during handover from an LTE access network to a Wi-Fi access network.
Client-based handover provides a transparent experience, without the need to reestablish TCP and UDP sessions, because the software client masks all physical interfaces behind the virtual network adapter. All sockets are set up from this virtual adapter and do not need to be reestablished by the TCP/IP stack.

**Options for 3G-to-Wi-Fi Handover**

Although not standardized, three commonly considered designs can be used to provide handover between 3G and Wi-Fi RANs. All of them rely on the existence of the P-GW in the network and so indirectly require an upgrade of the network to EPC.

One option is to integrate the 3G network into the EPC using an S4-capable SGSN. Figure 17 illustrates the architecture.
**Figure 17.** Architecture for Integrating 3G Network into EPC Using S4-Capable SGSN

This option enables the P-GW to handle the 3G connections with the S2a type of handover.

The second option relies on S2c support on the user equipment. Such equipment can open a DSMIPv6 tunnel to the P-GW over any type of access network, including 3G. In this case, the 3G network itself is not integrated into the EPC. However, the user sessions are anchored on the P-GW from all types of access networks. This approach may require an upgrade of the policy and charging systems to LTE standards. Also, 3G QoS parameters are not visible for the P-GW in such a scenario.

The third option is based on S2a interface support on a traditional 3G GGSN. The 3G connections are passed by PMIPv6 to the P-GW and anchored there. This solution is not commonly used because of the lack of MAG functions on most GGSNs.

Operators can implement other designs based on IETF standards for MIPv6 or PMIPv6 protocols. These designs depend on the capabilities of the deployed packet core elements and will vary from one network to another.

**Inter-Radio Mobility Conclusion**

As discussed here, the handover between RANs is not simple. Today, standards exist and are being improved to reflect the market experience; however, fully functional, transparent handover has not been widely deployed in live networks.

The main challenge is with the user equipment, in which the behavior of the various systems is not predictable, the implementation of TCP/IP stacks varies, and access network attach and detach decisions are not consistent across different handset types and manufacturers. The systems tend to be closed for driver-level software updates and therefore often do not allow third-party client software to be widely deployed by operators. 3GPP and other standardization bodies (such as the Wireless Broadband Alliance and Open Mobile Alliance) are addressing these challenges today with connection managers, and centralized offload policies (based on the Access Network Discovery and Selection Function[ANDSF]), but these need time to win wide adoption.
Today's networks need to be ready for later implementations of various standards enabling handover with or without user equipment client software.

**Untrusted Non-3GPP IP Access Network**

The first 3GPP Wi-Fi integration standards considered the Wi-Fi networks as untrusted access. There were multiple reasons for that approach. The networks were not secured by EAP authentication, were not encrypted, and often belonged to third-party service providers. Therefore, the standard required that security mechanisms be implemented directly between the user equipment and the packet core.

In general, the architecture for untrusted access enables subscribers to use any type of access network to which they can connect. After the subscriber connects, the software client on the user equipment opens an IP Security (IPsec) tunnel to the packet core, where the tunnel is authenticated and assigned an IP address; all data traffic is then routed over the packet core. All PCC-related functions can be reused from the existing core.

The 3GPP TS 23.234 specification handles 3G and untrusted Wi-Fi integration. For LTE, untrusted access is specified in the same document (3GPP TS 23.402) as trusted access. The standard introduces a new packet core function, tunnel termination gateway (TTG), responsible for terminating the IPsec tunnels and switching the traffic from these IPsec tunnels to GTP tunnels to traditional GGSNs. In the LTE architecture, this function is part of the evolved packet data gateway (ePDG). Figure 18 shows this architecture.

**Figure 18. Architecture for Untrusted Non-3GPP IP Access Network**

The untrusted standards also consider the inter-radio handover procedures:

- In LTE, the S2b interface built on PMIPv6 offers handover capabilities similar to those of S2a. The ePDG fulfills the MAG function in this case.
- In LTE, S2c (client-based) handover can also be used over untrusted access networks.
- In 3G, a specific standard (3GPP TS 23.327) describes the handover. In brief, it is client-based, with DSMIPv6 tunnels between the user equipment and GGSN and with the home agent function integrated.
Conclusion: Cisco Service Provider Wi-Fi Offload Solution

With its long history of Wi-Fi experience and strong presence in the mobile packet core, Cisco is well positioned to offer an industry-leading end-to-end solution for Wi-Fi offload. The main elements of this solution are:

- Cisco Intelligent Access: A leading Wi-Fi access and controller portfolio with technology to enable excellent coverage and radio efficiency
- Cisco ASR 1000 Series Aggregation Services Routers and Cisco Intelligent Services Gateway (ISG): A combination that offers flexible policy and authentication of Wi-Fi subscribers and a full set of the functions required from the WAG
- Cisco ASR 5000 Series: Cisco’s flagship product for packet core functions, with the Small Cell Gateway for functions relevant to Wi-Fi/3G/4G handover such as P-GW, TTG, ePDG, and PCEF
- Cisco Prime™ product suite: Network management software for end-to-end network visibility and operations; includes elements for network services such as Cisco Access Registrar for AAA functions, Cisco Network Registrar for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) functions, Cisco Network Control System for centralized Wi-Fi network management and SP Wi-Fi Service Manager for subscriber policy, self-provisioning, captive portal, and more

Cisco is committed to providing a Wi-Fi offload solution that is scalable, flexible, and ready for the upcoming industry evolution as described in this document.

For More Information

For more information about the end-to-end architecture and product details, please see cisco.com/go/spwifi.